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This paper argues that openness to goods trade in combination with an unequal distribution of 
political power has been a major determinant of the comparatively slow development of 
resource- or land-abundant regions like South America and the Caribbean in the nineteenth 
century. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model with a tax-financed public 
sector, and show that in a feudal society (dominated by landed elites) productivity-enhancing 
public investments like the provision of schooling are typically lower in an open than in a 
closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to trade, development is faster in a 
democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and demonstrate that, in political 
equilibrium, a land-abundant and landowner-dominated economy supports openness to trade. 
Finally, we discuss empirical evidence which strongly supports our basic hypotheses. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental facts regarding long run development in the last cen-
turies is the remarkable divergence between countries in per capita income levels. For
instance, Latin America as a whole had somewhat higher per capita income after indus-
trialization in the colonization period between the 16th and 18th century than North
America (i.e., the US and Canada) (see Maddison, 2003, Tab. 4-1). Nowadays, per
capita GDP of North America exceeds that of Latin America by a factor of almost ￿ve.
Most economists agree that the relatively dismal growth performance and slow in-
dustrialization of many resource- or land-abundant regions like those of Latin America
after independence are critically aﬀected by their institutions.1 On a general level, the
main argument is that the distribution of political power aﬀects political institutions
(e.g., the form of government, voting rights legislation) which in turn determine eco-
nomic institutions like property rights legislation, the education system or the trade
regime.2
This paper contributes to the literature on political institutions and growth by ar-
guing that inequality of political power in interaction with the trade regime determines
the public provision of education and infrastructure, and thus its economic develop-
ment. More speci￿cally, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium model with a tax-
￿nanced public sector, and show that in a feudal society, which is dominated by landed
elites, productivity-enhancing public investments are typically lower in an open than
in a closed economy. Moreover, we ￿nd that, under openness to trade, development is
faster in a democratic system. These results suggest that an unequal distribution of
political power in combination with openness to trade has been a major determinant
of the comparatively slow development of resource- or land-abundant regions like the
￿New World￿ economies in South America and the Caribbean. In addition, we show
1Seminal work on institutions and development was done by North (1981, 1988).
2For a systematic outline of this framework, see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004). So
the diﬀerence to standard growth theory is to endogenize the economic conditions for development
by political institutions which themselves are shaped by political power. For instance, several recent
theoretical studies have endogenized the level of property rights protection (see e.g. Tornell, 1997;
Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa, 2003; Gradstein, 2004). For a comprehensive discussion of the role of
property rights for economic development, see Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
1that lack of public education is an impediment to structural change from agriculture
to manufacturing. This induces a negative feedback to industrialization by preventing
learning-by-doing eﬀects in manufacturing.3 Finally, we simultaneously endogenize the
second economic institution which drives development in our model along with the
provision of public education: the trade regime. We demonstrate that, in political
equilibrium, a land-abundant and landowner-dominated economy supports openness
to trade without providing public schooling.
Our analysis suggests that, without openness big landlords might have supported
education for promoting productivity in the manufacturing sector in order to get ac-
cess to cheaper manufacturing products. In contrast, with access to the world market
the landed elites had no incentives to implement reforms towards a better educated
labor force at home. As argued in more detail at the end of the paper, focussing on
the case of New World economies, our basic mechanism is well-supported by empirical
evidence. First, there has been a substantial degree of inequality in the distribution
of political power in many Southern New World economies towards big landowners at
least until the beginning of the 20th century (e.g., Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000; En-
german, Haber and Sokoloﬀ, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002), related to a failure
to introduce an eﬀective education system (Reimers, 2004). Second, there is over-
whelming evidence that - thanks to dramatically falling transport costs and support
by trade policy - commodity markets have become highly integrated in the late 19th
century. Consistent with our theory, Latin American economies have been major ex-
porters of agricultural goods and mineral resources, in turn importing manufacturing
goods from the European industrial core (e.g., O￿Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1996;
Williamson, 1998; Maddison, 2000; BØrtola and Williamson, 2003).
The literature on institutions and development has recently become a core ￿eld in
the study of economic growth. For instance, in an interesting but diﬀerent approach
3Matsuyama (1992) analyzes a two-sector model which shows that an increase in agricultural
productivity may have a negative impact on growth (fueled by learning-by-doing in the manufacturing
sector) in a small open economy and is positively related to growth in autarky, when the income
elasticity of demand for the agricultural good is less than unitary. In contrast, we analyze the role
of the political system and the trade regime for the political equilibrium and its implications for
structural change and development.
2to ours, Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2003) analyze for a closed economy the politico-
economic equilibrium regarding growth-enhancing public expenditure on education.4
They argue that ultimately the accumulation of physical capital will give landown-
ers incentives to support public education because of capital-skill complementarity.
However, the point in time for this to happen is adversely related to land inequality.
Therefore, high land inequality is an impediment for development.5 In an alternative
approach, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that European settlers
introduced property rights protection in previously poor economies, which has been fa-
vorable to future investments, whereas they expropriated resource- and land-abundant
regions.6
From a theoretical point of view, the main innovation that our analysis contributes
to the literature on institutions and development is to examine the interaction between
the political system and the trade regime when tax-￿nanced public investments are
essential for economic progress. In contrast to Galor et al. (2003), we argue that the
open trade regime prevalent in landowner-dominated oligarchies has played a salient
role for their incentives to block educational reforms. That is, the political power of
landed elites in combination with openness to world trade has been responsible for
the dismal growth performance of many resource-abundant but nowadays less devel-
oped economies. Moreover, whereas Galor et al. assume perfect substitutability of
agricultural and manufacturing goods, in our political mechanism the impact of both
4In a related paper by Gradstein and Justman (1997), typically, a democratic choice is favorable to
public education and growth as opposed to an elite society. Their closed economy, one-sector model
is, however, not designed to explain the interests of landed elites and does not refer to the role of the
trade regime.
5In a similar fashion, Galor and Moav (2003) argue that the demise of the class struggle between
capitalists and workers in Europe and the U.S. can be led back to eventually coinciding interests with
respect to public education, induced by a gradual decline in the marginal productivity of physical
capital as capital accumulated. This view is in contrast to a recent literature which argues that
democratization has been deliberately supported by the elites to avoid social unrest and revolution
(e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001) or to reap the bene￿ts from an educated labor force.
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) analyze the trade-oﬀ solved by elites when education of the poor has
positive externalities to them but inevitably leads to an extended voting participation, and thus to
redistribution from the elites to the poor.
6Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that a high settler mortality rate in the 19th century discouraged
settlements and thus has led colonizers to set up ￿extracting states￿. In contrast, they introduced
property rights legislation in regions which have been more favorable to settlement.
3higher public investments and a change in the trade regime works through changes in
relative goods prices. We also allow for heterogeneity among landowners where small
landowners are more inclined to give up their land and become workers in the process
of development. This accounts for a plausible feature of structural change.7
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the
model. Section 3 derives the economic equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes for democracy
as well as for a feudal system the political equilibrium regarding both public investment
for a given trade regime and the trade regime itself. Moreover, we examine the impli-
cations of the politico-economic equilibrium for structural change. Section 5 provides a
dynamic version of the model which incorporates productivity spillovers and learning-
by-doing eﬀects of endogenous structural change towards manufacturing. Section 6
discusses the empirical relevance of our analysis for Latin American development. The
last section summarizes and brie￿y discusses some implications for development policy
today. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider a two-sector economy (￿agriculture￿ and ￿manufacturing￿), producing two
consumption goods under perfect competition. The price of the agricultural good (X)
is normalized to unity.8 The price of the manufacturing good (Y )i sd e n o t e db yp.
7In contrast to Galor and Weil (2000), Galor et al. (2003) and Galor and Moav (2003, 2004), we do
not provide a uni￿ed growth theory in the sense that human capital accumulation endogenously arises
as a consequence of prior development processes, and becomes the engine of growth in later stages of
development (for a survey on uni￿ed growth theory, see Galor, 2004). At least for Latin America, there
is evidence of a continued struggle between the industrial elite in the cities and landowners where the
former gradually gained power during the twentieth century (e.g., Coatsworth and Williamson, 2002;
BØrtola and Williamson, 2003; Reimers, 2004). Interestingly, this occurred in parallel with signi￿cant
increases in protectoral measures in Europe and the U.S. which limited trade with Latin America.
This suggests that the ￿globalization backlash￿ in the twentieth century weakened political power of
landowners and, consistent with the predictions of our theory, altered their attitude towards public
education to some degree. Thus, our model not only provides a good description of the divergence of
Latin America and Western economies particularly in the nineteenth century, still echoing today, but
is also consistent with a change in Latin America￿s public education policy thereafter.
8The X−good may also be interpreted as some natural resource like silver or gold. For instance,
mining was the primarily form of production in Spanish colonies such as Mexico and Peru, and silver
and gold their ￿rst primary export. In contrast, other colonies like Jamaica, Barbados, Cuba and
Brazil primarily grew sugar, tobacco, coﬀee and other staple crops for the world market.
4Under free trade, p is exogenously given by the world market at ﬂ p ∈ R++.
There is a unit mass of individuals, of initially three types: big landlords, small
landlords and landless workers, indexed i = B,S,W, with fraction (and number) ￿B ∈
(0,1), ￿S ∈ [0,1 − ￿B) and ￿W =1− ￿B − ￿S, respectively. Each big landlord owns
an amount ρB of land, whereas a small landlord owns ρS < ρB of land. Thus, the
economy￿s total land endowment is given by ﬂ R = RB + RS,w h e r eRB ≡ ￿BρB and
RS ≡ ￿SρS.
Moreover, each individual holds a unit time endowment. (Individuals do not diﬀer
in abilities.) For simplicity, individuals have homothetic and identical preferences over
the two consumption goods, which can be represented by a linearly homogenous utility
function u(x,y) meeting the standard properties.9 Thus, the indirect utility function




where g(•) is a strictly decreasing function.
Landowners can decide whether to be active farmers or to give up their land. This
captures the possibility of migration from land to the cities, i.e., urbanization and ex-
pansion of the manufacturing sector, which is an important feature of structural change.
If not working as farmer, an individual supplies its time endowment inelastically to a
perfect labor market. The unit time endowment of active farmers is fully absorbed
by supervising and organizing agricultural production (and sales) at their land. If a
landlord decides not to be active as farmer, either this land is not used or another
individual has to employ one unit of labor for supervising agricultural production at
this land. As will become apparent below, this assumption simpli￿es the analysis by
removing the land market from the model. In Appendix B, we relax the assumption
such that structural change goes along with a selling of land by small to big landowners,
9Allowing for non-homothetic preferences, e.g., accounting for ￿Engel￿s law￿, does not aﬀect the
main insights from our analysis regarding the con￿ict between landed elites and workers on the pre-
ferred level of public investment (and the role of the trade regime), but makes the mechanisms much
less transparent and considerably complicates the analysis.
5and show that the insights of our analysis remain unaﬀected.
Both sectors employ constant-returns-to-scale technologies. The agricultural good
is produced with land and labor, which are perfect complements.10 Denoting dependent
labor input as li, a farmer of group i = B,S produces output xi according to the
production function
x
i = AX min(ρ
i,l
i). (2)
The production technology for output Y in the manufacturing sector is given by
Y = AYLY, (3)
where LY denotes labor input in manufacturing. In order to ensure that there are
enough labor resources in the economy such that the manufacturing sector can be
active even if all landlords choose to fully employ their land to produce the X−good,
we assume ﬂ R + ￿B + ￿S < 1, i.e., ﬂ R<￿ W =1− ￿B − ￿S.
Productivity level AY, and possibly also AX,c a nb ei n ￿uenced by policy. In par-
ticular, we assume that they are functions of the level of public expenditure G, i.e.,
Aj = fj(G),j= X,Y. (4)
For instance, G can be interpreted as (per capita) spending on public (compulsory)
schooling or investment in public infrastructure.11 Suppose that fX(•) ful￿lls fX(0) > 0,
f0
X(•) ≥ 0 and f00
X(•) ≤ 0. fY(•) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and ful-






Y(G)=0 . It is plausible to assume,
particularly with respect to educational expenditure, that public investment G is
10This assumption not only simpli￿es the analysis considerably but is also plausible in view of the
limited substitution possibilites in traditional agricultural production.
11For the interpretation of G as (per capita) schooling investment (recall that there is a unit mass
of individuals), let AY be the eﬃciency unit per manufacturing worker, which positively depends on
G. That is, output Y is determined by the employed eﬃciency units of labor (i.e., the human capital
stock), AY LY , in manufacturing. Productivity AX can be thought of being determined by a spillover
eﬀect from technological knowledge AY in manufacturing. Formally, such a spillover can be written
as AX = F(AY )=F(fY (G)) ≡ fX(G), where the mapping F represents the spillover eﬀect.
6more eﬀective in the manufacturing sector than in the agricultural sector.12 De￿n-
ing αj(G): =Gf0
j(G)/fj(G) as the elasticity of productivity Aj with respect to G in
sector j = X,Y, this means
αX(G) < αY(G). (A1)
Public spending is ￿nanced by taxes T i, i = B,S,W. The government budget is
balanced.
3 Economic Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each dependent worker must be indiﬀerent between working for a farmer
or working in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the wage rate paid by both sectors co-
incides; it is denoted by w. Moreover, production technology (2) and ￿xed supervising
requirements imply that either li = ρi or li =0 , i = B,S. Thus, the gross income level
of an active farmer i is given by13
I
i =( AX − w)ρ
i =( fX(G) − w)ρ
i, i = B,S.( 5 )
Gross income of a dependent worker is given by w since workers inelastically supply




i, i = B,S,W. (6)
If mS >m W, a small farmer hires ρS units of labor. In contrast, if mS <m W,h e
gives up his land and works either for a big landlord or in the manufacturing sector,
earning wage income w. In this case, he will not be able to sell the land at a positive
12Thinking about the late 19th century, for instance, skill requirements for manufacturing pro-
duction have increased substantially during the ￿second￿ industrial revolution (the petro-chemical
industrial wave), which embodied fairly complex technologies (e.g., BØrtola and Williamson, 2003).
The assumption that the eﬀectiveness of an increase in G is larger in the manufacturing sector is
perhaps more debatable in the case of infrastructure provision like railways, which also promoted
agricultural exports.
13A positive income of active farmers requires AX >w . This may require further restrictions on
(parameters of) the model, which will be made explicit in later footnotes.
7price (see, however, the modi￿cation of the model in Appendix B). To see this, note
that any landless individual using this land for agricultural production requires to earn
at least outside option mW, and an already active farmer has to hire somebody for
supervision at wage rate w.S i n c emS <m W ≤ w if a small farmer gives up his land,
employing this land does not pay for anybody, so its price will be zero. (Analogous
considerations hold for a big landlord.) Let wi, i = B,S,b et h ew a g er a t e sa tw h i c ha
landowner of group i is indiﬀerent between working as farmer or as dependent worker;
formally, wi is given by (AX − wi)ρi − T i = wi − T W, according to (5) and (6). This
implies for the threshold values at which farmers give up land
w
i =
T W − T i + AXρi
1+ρi , i = B,S.( 7 )
If taxes are uniform,14 then wi = AXρi/(1+ρi). Allowing for non-uniform tax schedules
alters the result in a straightforward manner. If, say, T S >T W,t h e nwS is smaller
than in the case of uniform taxes for any given level of AX. That is, small landlords
take into account that giving up their land would imply a more favorable tax treatment
and thus become dependent worker for a lower wage rate than if taxes were uniform.
As this straightforward eﬀect is not central to our main arguments, we can further




W = G,( A 2 )
where the latter equation follows from the balanced budget assumption. Moreover, wi
is strictly increasing in ρi and positive under A2. Thus, 0 <w S <w B for all G ≥ 0.
Denoting the share of small and big landowners who are active as farmers by s and
b,w eh a v ei nt o t a lb￿B + s￿S active farmers employing an amount ￿ R(s,b) ≡ bRB +
14The shape of the tax schedules is irrelevant for the decision of farmers to give up their land. For
an income tax Ti(Ii) we have TW(wi) − Ti((AX − w)ρi), at the right-hand side of (7). Thus, the
threshold wage wi is implicitly de￿ned ((Ti)0 < 1 guarantees a unique wi), i = B,S. Only the tax
burden at wi matters for structural change. Any tax, whether lump-sum or not, with a uniform tax
burden at wi is neutral in our context. (Note that individual eﬀort supply is inelastic.) Thus, we
don￿t lose anything by focussing on lump-sum taxes only.
8sRS of both land and labor (which coincide under production technology (2)). Thus,
manufacturing employment is given by LY =1−b(￿B +RB)−s(￿S +RS) ≡ ￿ LY(s,b).
(Note that ￿ LY(1,1) = ￿W − ﬂ R>0.)
Finally, note that pro￿t maximization under perfect competition in the Y −sector
implies
w = pAY = pfY(G), (8)
according to (3). We are now ready to derive the equilibrium under autarky and in a
small open economy, respectively.
3.1 Autarky
This section examines the equilibrium outcomes under autarky and derives comparative-
static results with respect to an increase in public spending G.
Since preferences are homothetic, utility maximization implies that aggregate de-
mand for the manufacturing good relative to aggregate demand of the agricultural
good is a strictly decreasing function of p, and independent of any income variables.
Denote this function by D(p) and note that D0(•) < 0. In a goods market equilib-
rium, Y/X = D(p),w h e r eX = AX ￿ R(s,b) is total output of the agricultural sector
and Y = AY ￿ LY(s,b) is manufacturing output. Consequently, the (relative) equilibrium
price p is given by
￿ LY(s,b)ξ = D(p) ￿ R(s,b), (9)
where ξ ≡ AY/AX = fY(G)/fX(G) ≡ ￿ ξ(G).T h i sd e ￿nes p as a function ￿ p(G,s,b) with
the following properties.
Lemma 1. Under A1, ￿ p(G,s,b) is decreasing in G, and increasing in s and b.
Assumption A1 implies ￿ ξ
0
> 0.A n i n c r e a s e i n G is more eﬀective in enhancing
productivity, and thus output, of the manufacturing sector. Hence, the relative price p
of the Y −good must decrease after an increase in G in order to restore the goods market
equilibrium. In fact, the required decrease in p (shifting demand towards the Y −good)
9is less pronounced the higher the elasticity of substitution between the two goods,
ε(p) ≡− pD0(p)/D(p).M o r e o v e r , p increases if production of the Y −good declines
and that of the X−good increases, which explains why ∂￿ p/s > 0 and ∂￿ p/b > 0.
Using (8) and p =￿ p(G,s,b),w eg e tf o rt h ew a g er a t ew
w =￿ p(G,s,b)fY(G) ≡ ￿ w(G,s,b). (10)
Lemma 2. ∂ ￿ w(G,s,b)/∂G>(=,<)0 if and only if ε(￿ p(G,s,b)) > (=,<)1 −
αX(G)/αY(G).M o r e o v e r ,￿ w(G,s,b) is increasing in s and b.
An increase in G has two opposing eﬀects on the wage rate w. On the one hand,
relative output price p declines under A1. This has a negative eﬀect on wage rate w.
On the other hand, productivity in the Y − sector is raised when G increases, which has
a positive eﬀect on w. The net eﬀect hinges on the relationship between the elasticity
of relative goods demand D(p) with respect to p, ε(p), and the relative elasticity of
productivity with respect to G in the two sectors, αX(G)/αY(G).I fε or αX/αY is high,
then only a small decrease in p is required to restore the equilibrium after an increase
in G. Thus, the productivity eﬀect of G dominates and the wage rate w rises with G.
However, the opposite may be true if both ε and αX/αY are low. For instance, in the
special case in which G is only eﬀective in the manufacturing sector (i.e., αX =0 ),
and utility function u is Cobb-Douglas i.e., ε =1 ), an increase in G has no eﬀect on
￿ w(•,s,b).I nf a c t ,u(x,y)=xχy1−χ, 0 < χ < 1,i m p l i e sD(p)=( 1−χ)/(χp), and thus,
￿ w(•,s,b)=
(1 − χ) ￿ R(s,b)AX
χ￿ LY(s,b)
, (11)
according to (9) and (10). We will refer to this case of Cobb-Douglas utility with
AX = const. as Example in the following.15
So far, the autarky equilibrium has been characterized for given fractions of active
15Note that in this Example, AX > ￿ w(G,1,1) (implying that gross income of farmers is positive)
requires χ￿W > ﬂ R,a s￿ LY (1,1) = ￿W − ﬂ R and ￿ R(1,1) = ﬂ R. (This also implies AX > ￿ w(G,0,1) since
￿ w(G,s,b) is increasing in s,a c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a2 . )
10farmers, b and s. Besides goods market clearing and labor market clearing, however,
in equilibrium, landlords must not have an incentive to deviate from their decisions
whether to become workers or to remain farmers. Diﬀerent occupational regimes may
result in equilibrium, depending on how many farmers give up their land and move
to manufacturing. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium regimes in
autarky.
Proposition 1. (Autarky equilibrium). Under A2, sAUT, bAUT and wAUT =
￿ w(G,s,b) are an autarky equilibrium if and only if one of the following conditions hold,
where wi = AXρi/(1 + ρi), i = B,S.
(i) ￿ w(G,1,1) ≤ wS and sAUT = bAUT =1 .
(ii) ￿ w(G, ￿ s,1) = wS for 0 < ￿ s<1 and sAUT =￿ s, bAUT =1 .
(iii) wS ≤ ￿ w(G,0,1) ≤ wB and sAUT =0 , bAUT =1 .
(iv) ￿ w(G,0,￿ b)=wB for 0 < ￿ b<1 and sAUT =0 , bAUT = ￿ b.
Recall that wS and wB (with wS <w B) are the threshold wages at which small and
big landowners, respectively, are indiﬀerent of being active as farmers or to become
workers. Moreover, mS > (<)mW if w<(>)wS, and analogously for big landowners,
since increasing wage rates reduce income from farming (through rising labor costs)
and bene￿t workers. Note ￿rst that s>0 implies ￿ w(G,s,b) ≤ wS <w B and thus
b =1 . That is, if ever, big landowners are the last to become workers. Part (i) of
Proposition 1 describes the case in which all landlords remain farmers, as the wage is
below threshold wS. I nt h ec a s eo fp a r t( i i ) ,w eh a v ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nw i t hs o m e
small landlords being farmers and others being workers. To see that no other pair
(s,b) 6=( ￿ s,1), 0 < ￿ s<1, can be an equilibrium, note that at w<w S all landowners
want to remain farmers, i.e., (s,b)=( 1 ,1), which is inconsistent with presumption
wS =￿ w(G,￿ s,1) < ￿ w(G,1,1). Similarly, if w>w S,t h e ns =0 , which is inconsistent
with ￿ w(G,0,1) < ￿ w(G, ￿ s,1) = wS. Part (iii) refers to the case in which the wage
rate is in a medium range: high enough to induce small landlords to withdraw from
their land, but low enough for all big landowners to remain farmers. In case (iv),
small landlords all become workers since w = wB >w S, whereas a more or less large
11fraction of big landlords remain farmers. To see that this is the only equilibrium
when wB < ￿ w(G,0,1),n o t et h a ta n y(s,b) 6=( 0 ,￿ b) would require ￿ w(G,0,1) ≤ wB,i n
contradiction to wB =￿ w(G,0,￿ b) < ￿ w(G,0,1). Finally, b =0cannot hold in autarky
equilibrium, as this would imply that output of the X−good is zero. Since the case
that big landlords give up their land to become workers (b<1)i so fn oi n t e r e s ti no u r
context anyway, we shall focus the analysis in the remainder of the paper exclusively
on b =1 .
Proposition 1 also shows that, in general, in case (ii) sAUT varies with G since
￿ s,d e ￿ned by condition ￿ w(G,￿ s,1) = wS, is a function of G. I na na n a l o g o u sw a y ,
￿ b would be a function of G in case (iv) with bAUT < 1. However, in our Example,
these equilibrium values are independent of public investment G, i.e., an increase in
G can never induce structural change. To see this, note ￿rst that threshold wages
wi = AXρi/(1 + ρi), i = B,S,a r ec o n s t a n ti fAX is constant. Second, according to
(11), also ￿ w(G,s,b) is independent of G.T h u s ,G doesn￿t enter the criterion ￿ w T wi
so that the autarky equilibrium sAUT, bAUT and wAUT depend on preferences, land
endowments and exogenous technological fundamentals only.
The political equilibrium will depend on how well diﬀerent agents fare under a
certain G−choice. For this, consider the indirect utility functions given by
V
i =[ ( AX − w)ρ
i − G]g(p),i = B,S, (12)
V
W =[ w − G]g(p), (13)
according to assumption A2, (1), (5) and (6). Recalling g0(p) < 0, it follows that
all individuals gain as consumers from cheaper manufacturing goods. The next result
shows that this unambiguously occurs in any autarky equilibrium when G increases.16
Corollary 1. (Relative price in autarky equilibrium). Under A1 and A2, autarky
equilibrium price ￿ pAUT(G) ≡ ￿ p(G,sAUT,b AUT) is decreasing in G.
16Moreover, if G is raised, active farmers may also gain from higher sales revenue, to the extent that
fX(G) is increasing. Finally, they bene￿t from an increase in G if wages decrease (i.e., if ε+αX/αY < 1,
according to Lemma 2), which of course would hurt workers. But also the opposite may hold, since
∂ ￿ w(G,s,b)/∂G>0,i sp o s s i b l e .
12Corollary 1 is important when comparing the autarky equilibrium with the equilib-
rium under openness, which is done next. This comparison will ultimately be the key
to gain insight in the analysis of the political equilibrium in section 4.
3.2 Small Open Economy
In a small open economy (SOE), we have p =ﬂ p. Thus, domestic public policy can-
not bene￿t individuals as consumers by lowering the price p, contrary to the autarky
regime. Moreover, w =ﬂ pAY =ﬂ pfY(G) ≡ wSOE. Hence, the wage rate under openness
unambiguously increases in G. In contrast, according to the analysis in the previous
section, wAUT may increase or decrease with G, or remains unaﬀected. Thus, workers
may bene￿t more from an increase in G under openness than in autarky since, under
plausible conditions, the wage eﬀect of an increase in G is higher under openness.17
(Obviously, it also holds in our Example above, where changes in G do not aﬀect au-
tarky wages at all.) Thus, under openness to trade, an increase in G gives rise to
a distributional con￿ict between farmers and dependent workers (see (12) and (13)),
which is not the typical case under autarky.
The next result characterizes the occupational structure. It shows that in equi-
librium of a SOE, an increase in G does sooner or later lead to structural change
(whereas we saw that in autarky this possibly never happens). In the knife-edge case
that landowners are indiﬀerent between keeping the farm or becoming worker, we as-
sume that they are giving up their land.
Proposition 2. (Equilibrium in SOE). Let sSOE, bSOE denote the equilibrium
fractions of active landlords (small and big, respectively) under openness. Under A2:
(i) If ﬂ p￿ ξ(G) <
ρS
1+ρS,t h e n(sSOE,b SOE)=( 1 ,1).
(ii) If
ρS
1+ρS ≤ ﬂ p￿ ξ(G) <
ρB
1+ρB,t h e n(sSOE,b SOE)=( 0 ,1).
(iii) If ﬂ p￿ ξ(G) ≥
ρB
1+ρB,t h e n(sSOE,b SOE)=( 0 ,0).
17Generally, ∂wSOE/∂G =ﬂ pf0
Y > ∂wAUT/∂G if (1 − αX/αY )/ε +ﬂ p/￿ p>1. Thus, an increase in G
has a higher impact on the wage rate in SOE if relative elasticity αX/αY or substitutability between
goods, ε,a r es u ﬃciently small. (Use wAUT =￿ p(G,sAUT,b AUT)fY (G) and the derivation in Lemma
1, 2.)
13Since public investment is more eﬀective in raising manufacturing productivity un-
der A1, in SOE, farmers eventually will leave their land and become workers when G
rises.18
4 Political Equilibrium
The political equilibrium involves decisions in two dimensions: the choice of public
investment level G, and of the trade regime (autarky/openness). The equilibrium is
considered for two political systems, a ￿feudal society￿ and a ￿democracy￿.
Policy preferences of big landlords determine the political outcome in a feudal so-
ciety. Under democracy, workers￿ preferences are decisive. Policy preferences of small
landlords are important to evaluate welfare consequences of political equilibria. As
will become apparent, the interests of small landowners under openness are in line
with either those of big landowners or those of workers, depending on the size of their
landholdings, ρS. One can thus think of wealth requirements for voting participation
as a characteristic which distinguishes a feudal from a democratic system.19 Ad e m o -
cratic system can be thought of one in which people with no or little land determine
the political equilibrium. In contrast, if wealth requirements are high, then the pivotal
voter is a big landlord representing a landowner-dominated system. Finally, recall that
the behavior of small landlords determines whether there is structural change in the
economy.
For the role of the political system and of policy choices for economic development,
two channels are important. First, as the analysis of the economic equilibrium has
shown, public investment G in interaction with the trade regime determine to which
extent there is structural change. Second, the G−level determines the productivity
increase. In section 5, we extend the model to a dynamic framework in which eco-
18Note that sSOE = bSOE =0is possible in SOE, since goods do not have to be produced domes-
tically in order to satisfy demand. However, as pointed out already in section 3.1, we shall not pay
attention to the implausible case b<1 in the following.
19As will be discussed in section 6.1, wealth requirements for the assignment of voting rights were
prevalent and substantial in 19th century Latin America.
14nomic growth is positively related to investment G. The main results from our basic
(static) model remain qualitatively true.20 We will thus refer to a low level of G as an
impediment for development of the considered economy.
4.1 Public Investment in Political Equilibrium
Let Gi
SOE and Gi
AUT be the preferred levels of G of group i = B,S,W under openness
and under autarky, respectively. (For simplicity, we assume throughout that these
preferred levels are unique.)21 The following lemma characterizes policy preferences of
big landowners and workers with respect to G.







Y(G) for all G ≥ 0. (A3)
Then GB
SOE =0 , whereas GB




−1(1/ﬂ p) > 0. GW
AUT > 0 i sp o s s i b l e( a n di n d e e dp r e v a i l si nt h e
￿Example￿).
For an intuitive understanding of Lemma 3 it is useful to remember the charac-
terization of the economic equilibrium in the previous section. In SOE, the wage rate
wSOE =ﬂ pfY(G) unambiguously rises with G due to enhanced productivity in the man-
ufacturing sector.22 Thus, if the impact of an increase in G on agricultural production
is small (assumption A3), big landlords lose more than they gain from an increase in
G. They have to pay both higher taxes and higher wages without signi￿cantly raising
sales revenue. In contrast, workers in SOE simply face the trade-oﬀ between higher
20In addition, the dynamic model allows us to analyze the development path of the economy, after
a change in the political system or in the trade regime, respectively.
21Note that our focus on b =1requires ﬂ p￿ ξ(GW
SOE) < ρB/(1 + ρB) under openness and
￿ p(GW
AUT,0,1)￿ ξ(GW
AUT) ≤ ρB/(1 + ρB) in autarky (i.e., the preferred investment level of workers is
such that big landlords remain farmers). The former condition follows from Proposition 2. The latter
condition is equivalent to ￿ w(G,0,1) ≤ wB,e v a l u a t e da tG = GW
AUT, and follows from Proposition 1.
22Note that, according to part (ii) of Lemma 3, condition AX >w(implying that gross income of




This is ful￿lled if AX is suﬃciently high and/or ﬂ p is low. Under these conditions also AX > ﬂ pfY (0)
holds, which is relevant for a feudal and open economy.
15wages and higher taxes, which is a well-de￿ned problem leading to an interior solution
for GW
SOE with ∂GW
SOE/∂ﬂ p>0. That is, the higher the world market price for man-
ufacturing products, the higher the level of public education investment preferred by
workers. Under autarky, all individuals bene￿t from a lower price of the manufacturing
good if G increases (Corollary 1), whereas p =ﬂ p in SOE. Moreover, as argued in section
3.2, the wage eﬀect is typically smaller in autarky than under openness and may even
favor farmers. For instance, in our Example, neither sales of landlords nor production
costs of landlords are aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nG. Also wage income of workers is
unaﬀected. But since both groups gain as consumers of cheaper manufacturing goods,
they vote for a positive amount of G under autarky.
The next results show how the politico-economic equilibrium regarding public in-
vestment depends on the political system and the trade regime. We ￿rst ask how, given
the political system, changes in the trade regime aﬀect development.
Proposition 3. (Trade regime and development, conditional on political system).
Under A1-A3.
(i) In a feudal society, if anything, public investment is higher under autarky than
under openness.
(ii) In democracy, the trade regime does not matter in a systematic way for devel-
opment; that is, GW
SOE >,=,<G W
AUT is possible.
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is an immediate consequence of part (i) of Lemma 3.
It suggests that openness to trade is typically an impediment for development in a
political system which is dominated by big landowners. In contrast, according to part
(ii) of Proposition 3, public investment resulting in a democracy may be higher under
openness than in autarky.
The following proposition shows how, given the trade regime, the political system
aﬀects development.




SOE =0 , i.e., under openness, public investment is higher in democ-
racy than in feudal society.
(ii) Under autarky, the political system does not matter in a systematic way for
development; that is, GB
AUT >,=,<G W
AUT is possible.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 casts doubts on the conventional wisdom that openness to
goods trade always fosters development, suggesting that this may be true only under
democracy. In contrast, according to part (ii), the political system may not matter for
development under autarky.
Regarding the slow development of relatively open but politically very unequal re-
gions, like Latin America after independence, our results suggest that the ruling class
of big landlords had no incentive to introduce or strengthen productivity-enhancing
institutions like schooling due to their access to manufacturing products from abroad.
In addition, underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector contributed, to the bene-
￿t of farmers, to low wages. Without openness the landlords might have supported
productivity-enhancing education in order to get access to cheaper manufacturing prod-
ucts.
We now turn to welfare consequences. Of course, big landlords are always better
oﬀ in a feudal society, in which they are pivotal for the political outcome, and workers
bene￿t from democracy. The next result characterizes the welfare eﬀects of the political
system for small landlords by examining their policy preferences.
Proposition 5. (Small landlords). Assume A1-A3.
(a) Under openness, (i) if ﬂ p￿ ξ(GW
SOE) < ρS/(1 + ρS), welfare of small landlords is
maximized in a feudal society; (ii) if ﬂ p￿ ξ(0) > ρS/(1 + ρS), welfare of small landlords
is maximized in democracy; (iii) if ﬂ p￿ ξ(0) ≤ ρS/(1 + ρS) ≤ ﬂ p￿ ξ(GW
SOE),w e l f a r eo fs m a l l
landlords is maximized in a feudal society if fX(0)ρS+GW





and in a democratic society otherwise.
(b) Under autarky, the political system does not matter in a systematic way for
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Utility of small
landlords Part (a) of Proposition 5 is illustrated in Fig. 1. Recall that GB
SOE =0 .A s
long as small landlords do not become workers (i.e., s =1 ), their utility decreases




ﬂ p(1 + ρS)
⁄¢
≡ ￿ G, small landlords are indiﬀerent
between being active as farmer or as dependent worker (see Proposition 2). Thus,
for G> ￿ G their utility coincides with that of landless workers. Now, if utility of
small landlords is higher at point A than at point B, then they prefer zero investment,
whereas GW
SOE is optimal for them if vice versa. Also note that policy preferences of
small landlords are directly related to their landholding, ρS.I fρS is high, the interests
of big and small landlords coincide. That is, which group of landlords is pivotal doesn￿t
matter. What we call feudal society is thus consistent with a political system in which
the wealth requirement for voting participation is high. In contrast, the interests of
small landlords coincide with those of workers. Thus, a democracy may be seen as a
political system in which workers or landowners with little land are pivotal (e.g., if
wealth requirements for voting participation are low). Under autarky, a change in the
political system from, say, an oligarchic system to a democracy may increase or lower
welfare of small landlords in an unsystematic way, as suggested by Proposition 5 (b).
This also implies that in a political system in which small landowners are pivotal, the
political equilibrium does not depend in a systematic way on their landholdings ρS.
Proposition 5 is related to the decision of small landlords to be farmer or to be
employed as dependent worker. Suppose we start from an open economy with G =0
and s = b =1before individuals vote over the level of public investment. We may
then ask how the likelihood of structural change under openness, i.e., a switch s =1
to s =0(and thus from agricultural production to manufacturing), depends on the
political system.
Proposition 6. (Structural change in SOE). Under A1-A3. Suppose G =0
and s =1initially. Then under openness, if anything, structural change occurs in
democracy but never in a feudal society.
Democracy in an open economy, because it leads to higher public investment than
in a feudal society, also is more likely to promote structural change. This has important
18long-run implications. Structural change from agriculture to manufacturing production
may have positive feedback eﬀects upon the development process through learning-by-
doing in the manufacturing sector. They are worked out in the dynamic version of the
model in section 5.
4.2 Openness or Autarky in Political Equilibrium?
So far we have examined how education or infrastructure provision depends on the
interaction between the political system (feudal or democratic) and the trade regime
(openness vs. autarky). Now we also allow the trade regime, in addition to the level of
G, to be endogenously determined in political equilibrium (for either political system),
i.e., we analyze a two-dimensional voting choice. This is important because if, for
instance, openness would not arise in a feudal society under plausible conditions in our
model, one could argue that the result about the role of goods trade for development
in a feudal society is not of much interest.
For examining the plausibility of an open and feudal economy trapped in a low
education-low productivity equilibrium, we relate the political equilibrium regarding
the trade regime to the pattern of comparative advantage. Comparative advantages are
determined by the relationship between the autarky price ￿ pAUT(G) for some G−level,
and the world market price, ﬂ p.I f￿ pAUT(G) > ﬂ p, then the considered economy has a
comparative advantage with respect to the agricultural good, which is plausible for
a land-abundant, developing country. We consider ￿r s tt h et r a d er e g i m ei naf e u d a l
society.
Proposition 7. (Trade regime in feudal society). Under A2 and A3, openness is
supported in a feudal society if ￿ pAUT(GB
AUT) > ﬂ p.
According to Proposition 7, big farmers prefer to have access to the world market
whenever the economy has a comparative advantage in the X−good. In this case, the
change in relative prices induced by a change in the trade regime from autarky to open
goods markets lets big landlords unambiguously gain. Even if in autarky the wage rate
19would decrease with G (which would lower production costs of farmers), switching to
an open trade regime with GB
SOE =0unambiguously pays oﬀ for the landlords due to
the bene￿t as consumer. In addition, there may be saving of taxes for public schooling
provision.
Under democracy, the following holds.
Proposition 8. (Trade regime in democracy). Under A2, openness may or
may not be supported in a democracy. In particular, both outcomes are possible if
￿ pAUT(GW
AUT) > ﬂ p.
Proposition 8 shows that workers do not necessarily prefer openness to autarky,
although an open trade regime may be implemented in a democracy. This also applies
when the economy has a comparative advantage in the X−good, in contrast to the
unambiguous support of openness by landlords in an analogous situation (Proposition
7). On the one hand, workers gain as consumers when p declines after a change in the
trade regime; however, on the other hand, wage rates may be depressed.
5 A Dynamic Framework
In this section, we extend our basic model to a dynamic framework in which public
investments and structural change are the engines of development. This allows us to
examine explicitly how the development path depends on the interaction between the
political system and the trade regime of the economy.
5.1 Structure of the Dynamic Economy
For convenience, suppose that individuals are in￿nitely living in continuous time. For
simplicity, we assume that there are no savings or storage possibilities. Lifetime-utility
of an individual from group i = B,S,W, is then given by the present discounted value
of the stream of instantaneous utility V i(t)=g(p(t))mi(t) at time t ≥ 0, according to
20(1), i.e.,
R ∞
0 V i(t)e−βtdt,w h e r eβ > 0 is the time preference rate.23 Again, we focus on
uniform lump-sum taxation under a balanced budget (each period) to ￿nance public
investment (assumption A2).
The key assumption in this section is that productivity AY in the manufacturing
sector evolves over time according to24
œ AY(t)=fY(G(t))AY(t)
γLY(t)
θ − δAY(t), (14)
where γ > 0 and θ ≥ 0 give rise to intertemporal spillovers or learning-by-doing eﬀects
which render the impact of an increase in G for raising productivity more eﬀective if
the level of productivity or the amount of labor employed in the manufacturing sector
are high. If θ =0 , then manufacturing employment, LY(t), has no impact on the
future evolution of productivity AY.I f θ = γ,t h e n œ AY = fY(G)Y γ − δAY,w h i c h
resembles the learning-by-doing spillovers from output Y [= AYLY] as modelled, e.g.,
by Matsuyama (1992). However, we exclude the knife-edge case of balanced steady-
state productivity growth (which would occur if γ =1 ), i.e., we assume γ ∈ (0,1).
δ ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation rate of productivity AY.( T h e f u n c t i o n fY(G) has the
same properties as in the basic model.)
In the basic model, we assumed that public investment is less eﬀective in the
X−sector than in the Y − sector (assumption A1) and, for the analysis of the po-
litical equilibrium, focussed on the case in which the impact of a marginal increase
in G on AX is suﬃciently small (assumption A3). Here, we make our life simple by
supposing that AX is a constant. Finally, suppose for simplicity that the rest of the
world is in its steady state, i.e., output price p is ￿xed at ﬂ p in SOE at all times.
23Alternatively, in a discrete-time model we could replace the in￿nite-life assumption by hypothe-
sizing non-overlapping generations, each living one period, which are characterized by some dynastic
bequest motive ￿ la Barro (1974). That is, life-time utility of a member i of generation t is given by
Ui
t = V i
t + βUi





t . Results would be unchanged compared to the
continuous time version. An even simpler alternative, which however does not allow to examine the
development path but reproduces the results of our static version, is a two-period model in which
public investments made in period 1 pay oﬀ in terms of productivity gains in period 2.
24(14) replaces (4) from the basic model for the Y −sector.
215.2 Economic Equilibrium
Note from (9) that in autarky p is given by ￿ LY(s(t),b(t))AY(t)=D(p(t)) ￿ R(s(t),b(t))AX,
i.e., p is decreasing in AY. That is, output price p(t) falls as the economy develops
(driven by public investment), whereas the impact on the wage rate w(t)=p(t)AY(t)
is ambiguous.25 In contrast, under openness, since p(t)=ﬂ p, w is unambiguously in-
creasing in AY.
The autarky equilibrium can be characterized by a straightforward modi￿cation
of Proposition 1. For simplicity, we shall focus however on the case of Cobb-Douglas
preferences in which the wage rate is ￿xed to the level in (11). As a consequence,
the fractions of active farmers, s, b,a n dt h u sLY = ￿ LY(s,b) are independent of the
public investment stream and AY in the closed economy. For the open trade regime,
Proposition 2 implies the following evolution of employment in the manufacturing
sector.
Corollary 2. (Evolution of LY(t)). Suppose A2 holds. Under openness,
LY(t)=Φ(AY(t)) ≡

   
   
￿ LY(1,1) ≡ LI
Y if AY(t) <
AXρS
ﬂ p(1+ρS),
￿ LY(0,1) ≡ LII
Y if
AXρS
ﬂ p(1+ρS) ≤ AY(t) <
AXρB
ﬂ p(1+ρB),




Hence, under openness, there will be structural change when the economy develops,
where the state of development is measured by the productivity of the manufacturing
sector.26 That is, the economy may move from Regime I in early stages of development,
characterized by low manufacturing employment LI
Y,t oRegime II in later stages of
development, with LII
Y >L I
Y. In turn, according to (14), this has a positive feedback
eﬀect on the evolution of productivity if θ > 0, for any given path of G(t).27 In a steady
25w is increasing (decreasing) in AY if ε > (=,<)1.
26Introduction of a land market leads to a slight modi￿cation of (15) which however does not change
the results (see Appendix B).
27Irwin (2002) presents evidence which suggests that economic growth in the late 19th century was
crucially driven by structural change, i.e., by reductions in the share of agricultural employment. This
lends support to the accumulation equation (14).
22state with G(t)=G∗ (steady state values are indicated by superscript (*) hereafter)
we have œ AY =0 ,a n dt h u s ,LY(t)=L∗
Y = Φ(A∗





















In the following politico-economic analysis, we focus on the two key questions of the
paper which address the slow development process of relatively open, land- or resource-
abundant, but politically unequal economies like in Latin America. First, how does
the development path under openness depend on the political system, and second,
how does it depend on the trade regime in a feudal system? That is, we analyze the
qualitative eﬀects of a switch from a feudal society to a democracy under openness,
and a switch from a feudal society under openness to autarky.
Suppose that, initially, the economy is in a steady state with G =0and s = b =1 ,
i.e., AY(0) = Ψ(0,L I
Y) ≡ ΨI
0 > 0. Again, we focus on b =1 .28 Then, by virtue of the
assumption that policy preferences of big landlords determine the political equilibrium
in a feudal society, the following emerges.
Proposition 9. (Development path of SOE in feudal society). Under A2, in
political equilibrium of an open and feudal economy, there is neither development nor
structural change; that is, the economy gets stuck at (AY(t),G(t),L Y(t)) = (ΨI
0,0,L I
Y)
for all t ≥ 0.
As in the static version of the model, big landowners in an open economy have
no incentive to vote for an institutional reform, which would raise both wage cost and
taxes without aﬀecting output prices. Thus, the ruling class of big landowners prevents
both development and structural change under openness.
28This means, in analogy to the basic model, that big landowners do not want to give up their land
at any time t under path G(t) chosen by policy.
23Next we consider the political equilibrium in democracy, which is determined by
policy preferences of workers. Using (13), workers maximize
Z ∞
0
[ﬂ pAY(t) − G(t)]g(ﬂ p)e
−βtdt s.t. (14), (15), lim
T→∞
AY(T) ≥ 0, (17)
and given AY(0) = ΨI
0 and LY(0) = LI
Y. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 10. (Development path of SOE in democracy). Under A2, in political
equilibrium of an open and democratic economy, the development path has the following
properties.













(b) Initially, public investment jumps to G(0) > 0.I fθ =0 , then for t>0,
AY(t) and G(t) gradually increase along a saddle path towards a unique steady state
equilibrium. If θ > 0, then there may be a further jump in G(t), together with structural
change. After this structural change, AY(t) and G(t) gradually increase along a saddle
path towards higher steady state values than without structural change.
Comparing Proposition 9 and 10, a democracy will always fare better under open-
ness than a feudal society (as suggested by Proposition 4 in the static version of the
model), and - whenever there are learning-by-doing eﬀects from expansion of the man-
ufacturing workforce (θ > 0) - the more so if there is structural change.
Fig. 2 depicts the phase diagram of the saddle path equilibrium adjustment to the
steady state in an open and democratic economy without structural change (e.g., for
θ =0 ), whereas Fig. 3 shows a development path with both structural change through
learning-by-doing eﬀects from employment in the Y −sector. The ￿gures illustrate that
under openness a switch from a feudal system (stuck at ΨI
0)t od e m o c r a c ys t a r t sad e -
velopment process fueled by continuous investments in public education/infrastructure
and, possibly, structural change.
We now examine the political equilibrium in a closed economy. It turns out that the
development path is qualitatively similar under both a feudal system and a democracy
24 
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Figure 3:  Development path in an open and democratic economy if  0 θ > , 
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* Gif we assume Cobb-Douglas utility.
Proposition 11. (Development path under autarky in a feudal system). Under
A2, with Cobb-Douglas utility. In a closed economy political equilibrium under either
political system, initially, public investment jumps to G(0) > 0,a n df o rt>0, AY(t)
gradually increases and G(t) gradually decreases along a saddle path towards a unique
steady state equilibrium. The steady state is characterized by A∗
Y > ΨI




Comparing Proposition 9 and 11, a feudal system experiences economic develop-
ment under autarky but not under openness (as suggested by Proposition 3). Moreover,
a closed democracy clearly fares better that an oligarchic system under an open trade
regime. Fig. 4 illustrates the transition of the economy to a steady state under either
political system in the Cobb-Douglas example, with gradually increasing labor produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to the development process in an open
and democratic economy (Proposition 10), there will never be structural change under
Cobb-Douglas utility.
6 Evidence: The Case of New World Economies
This section discusses the empirical relevance of the basic mechanism underlying our
result that landowner-dominated societies, when integrated into world commodity mar-
kets, do not support growth-promoting institutions like public schooling. The historical
evidence on the political and economic structure of New World economies shows that
the analyzed interaction between the political system, trade regime and public educa-
tion indeed contributes to an understanding of the economic divergence between Latin
America and today￿s advanced countries. Two groups of historical facts are relevant.
First, the oligarchic political system in Latin America after independence, the status of
educational reforms and the role of human capital for industrialization in the late 19th
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+ −America exporting both agricultural goods and natural resources, in turn importing
manufacturing ones.
6.1 Oligarchic Structures and Human Capital
As pointed out by Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000), Engerman, Haber and Sokoloﬀ (2000)
and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002), although many parts of the Caribbean and South
America have formally been democracies, they lacked secrecy in balloting and had
both wealth and literacy requirements for voting. In addition, there has been an
extreme inequality in land holding and human capital. For instance, only 2.4 percent of
household heads in rural Mexico owned land in the year 1910, in contrast to 74.5 percent
in the US in 1900 and 87.1 percent in Canada in 1901 (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002).
Moreover, illiteracy rates in most South American and Caribbean places have been
(partly considerably) above 75 percent around 1870.29 As a result, voting participation
was usually below 10 percent. Moreover, in Spanish America ￿[e]lite families generally
acted as local representatives of the Spanish government in the countryside during
the colonial period and maintained their status long after independence￿ (Sokoloﬀ and
Engerman, 2000, p. 222). This has contributed, in addition to voting restrictions, to a
persistence of an undemocratic and oligarchic political system.
Moreover, due to widespread illiteracy and the failure to adopt eﬀective public edu-
cation policies, ￿Latin America was unprepared for the petro-chemical industrial wave
- the late 19th century ￿second￿ industrial revolution - which embodied more complex
technologies, larger scale and higher skill requirements￿ (BØrtola and Williamson, 2003,
p. 35). Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2001) provide interesting evidence for the impor-
tance of human capital for industrialization in the late 19th century U.S. economy.
They show that the adoption of the Corliss steam engine, a prime example of a general
purpose technology at that time, was crucially aﬀected by the regional availability of
29In contrast, illiteracy rates in the US have already been down to 20 percent in 1870 and 17.5
percent in Canada 1861 (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002; Tab. 8). See also Coatsworth (1993) for a
discussion of diﬀerences in both wealth inequality and public schooling investments between Latin
America and the US.
26skill.
As pointed out by Reimers (2004), a widespread acceptance of the desirability of
providing universal primary education - although long supported among a substantial
group of ￿liberals￿ - was not reached in Latin America before the mid-20th century.
Throughout the ￿rst half of the 20th century, ￿struggles between liberals and conserv-
atives continued with the conservatives loosely representing the interests of the landed
oligarchies￿ (Reimers, 2004, p. 10).30
6.2 Globalization in the 19th Century
Until the early 20th century, commodity markets were well integrated, even from to-
day￿s perspective. O￿Rourke (2001) provides an excellent survey which highlights the
signi￿cant drop in transport costs and European tariﬀ-cutting from mid-19th century
onwards (followed by a ￿globalization backlash￿ in the early 20th century). With 9.7
percent, merchandise exports as share of GDP in Latin America as a whole in 1870 was
as high as in 1998 (Maddison, 2000, Tab. 3-2b). Latin America exclusively exported
agricultural goods like sugar, tobacco, coﬀee and other staple crops, and natural re-
sources like silver or gold, well into the 20th century (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson,
2003). Tab. 1 shows, for instance, that over two-thirds of Brazilian exports have been
coﬀee between 1878 and 1938, whereas silver was Mexico￿s major export in the late
19th century. Columbia mainly exported coﬀee and tobacco, whereas Peru￿s export
portfolio, although to a substantial part consisting of sugar, was somewhat more di-
versi￿ed.
A ss h o w ni nT a b .2 ,e x p o r t ss h a r e sw e r es u b s t a n t i a li nb o t hN e wW o r l de c o n o m i e s
and the European industrial core, in 1913 amounting to over 16 percent in Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK, 9.1 percent in Mexico and 9.8 percent in Brazil. Moreover,
trade volumes were increasing fast between 1870 and 1913. In addition, there have
30As a result, illiteracy rates in 1960 have still been 39 percent in Brazil, 55 percent in Honduras,
and 35 percent in Mexico, down from 65, 67 and 77 percent in 1900, respectively, whereas those
countries with relatively low illiteracy rates in 1900 also saw the largest drop until 1960: from 50 to
16 percent in Chile and from 53 to 9 percent in Argentina (Reimers, 2004, Tab. 6).
27  1878-1882 1898-1902 
  Primary % Secondary % Primary % Secondary % 
Argentina  Wool 56  Hides  31 Wool 35  Wheat  23 
Uruguay  Hides 44  Wool  30 Wool 40  Hides  32 
Brazil  Coffee 70  Sugar  16 Coffee 65  Rubber  26 
Chile  Copper 68  Nitrate  32 Nitrate 81  Copper  19 
Colombia  Tobacco  61  Coffee  39 Coffee 92 Tobacco  8 
Mexico  Silver 92  Coffee  7  Silver 75  Copper  11 
Peru  Sugar 48  Silver  26 Sugar 32  Silver  23 
 
  1920-1924 1934-1938 
  Primary %  Secondary  % Primary %  Secondary  % 
Argentina  Wheat 31  Maize  20 Maize 25  Meat  22 
Uruguay  Meat 41 Wool 39 Wool 54  Meat 31 
Brazil  Coffee 83  Sugar  6  Coffee 68  Cotton 24 
Chile  Nitrate 75 Copper 25 Copper 62  Nitrate 38 
Colombia  Coffee 98 Tobacco 2  Coffee 74  Petroleum  26 
Mexico  Petroleum 69  Silver  16  Silver  31  Petroleum 31 
Peru  Sugar 31 Cotton 28  Petroleum  40 Cotton  27 
 
Table 1: Major exports in Latin America around 1900. 





  Exports/GDP Annual  Change 
  1870 1913  1870-1913 
France  4.9 7.8 2.8 
Germany  9.5 16.1 4.1 
Netherlands  17.4 17.3  2.3 
UK   12.2 17.5  2.8 
     
Argentina   - -  5.2 a  
Brazil  12.2 9.8  1.9 
Chile   - -  3.4 
Columbia  - -  2.0 
Mexico  3.9 9.1  5.4b 
Peru  - -  
     
Canada  - -  4.1 
US  2.5 3.7 4.9 
 
Table 2: Merchandise exports around 1900 as percent of GDP and annual 
average growth rate of volume. New world and European industrial core. 
Source: Maddison (2000, Tab. 3-10, F-5) 
a 1877-1912,  b1877/8-1910/1 
 been enormous capital ￿ows from the centre to the periphery. For instance, 32.7 of
world FDI has been to Latin America between 1870 and 1910, and the share of net
foreign inward investment in gross ￿xed capital formation was 70 percent in Argentina
and 75 percent in Mexico (O￿Rourke, 2001). Although direct data on import shares
is not available, it is evident from the massive goods exports and capital imports that
commodity imports to Latin America must have been enormous. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that good access to manufacturing goods from the world market has
governed policy preferences of big landowners.31 As pointed out by Earle (2003), ￿in
late nineteenth century Brazil, for example, the Sao Paulo elite spent the proceeds of
their coﬀee plantations on [...] European luxury products. This pattern was repeated
across Latin America￿. For instance, Orlove and Bauer (1997) provide details on
the expansion of imports during Chile￿s belle Øpoque. In particular, Chile￿s imports
consisted of building materials and architectural design (in addition to foreign wine
and hot beverages). Similarly, Langer (1997) provides insights into the signi￿cant
consumption of high-quality European textiles in Bolivia, e.g., among mestizo farmers.
These facts are consistent with our hypothesis that because of both export possibilities
of agricultural commodities, in which Latin America had a comparative advantage, and
consumption opportunities from imports of manufacturing goods, rich farmers had an
incentive to support an open trade regime (Proposition 7).32
In addition to trade volumes as indicator for openness, there is overwhelming evi-
dence on factor price convergence between Latin America and the European industrial
core (e.g., O￿Rourke et al., 1996; Williamson, 1998; O￿Rourke, 2001). Like predicted
by standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, and consistent with our small open econ-
omy assumption, rising external terms of trade in Latin America went along with a
falling wage rate (for unskilled labor) and rising land returns. For instance, according
to Williamson (1998, Tab. 1), the wage/rental ratio dropped by an annual rate of 4
percent in Argentina between 1870 and 1910, and by 3 percent in the New World as a
31In contrast to Latin America, countries like Germany and the UK had a well-developed manu-
facturing sector already in the 1870s. According to Broadberry (1998, Tab. 5), the manufacturing
employment share was 33.5 percent in the UK 1871, and 24.7 percent in Germany 1875.
32See Rogowski (1989) for a similar line of reasoning.
28whole. In our model, the external terms of trade are represented by 1/p,w h i c hr i s e s
as p drops from pAUT to ﬂ p after market integration. For a given stage of development,
re￿ected by manufacturing productivity, AY, this leads to a decrease in the wage rate,
w = pAY,a n dar i s ei nAX −w
£
= IB/ρB = IS/ρS⁄
which measures the land return in
our model.
Although this section has provided compelling evidence in favor of our theory, one
m a yo b j e c tt h a tt a r i ﬀs in Latin America have been comparatively high in the mid-19th
century, and did not decline for a prolonged period thereafter. So is this consistent
with the hypothesis that big landowners have been the ruling class, determining policy
outcomes, particularly - due to an open trade regime which they supported accord-
ing to our theory - opposing educational reforms? In a series of papers, Williamson
and co-authors examined the root of Latin American tariﬀ policy, concluding that
de-industrialization fears (of emerging industrialists, lobbying for protection) were en-
tirely absent in 19th century Latin America (e.g., Coatsworth and Williamson, 2002;
BØrtola and Williamson, 2003). Rather, they document that revenue requirements,
which were primarily determined by wars (between independence and 1880, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay all fought at least two major wars) and
internal power struggles, dictated tariﬀ policy in the 19th century.33 After indepen-
dence, Latin American economies were characterized by both low taxation capacity
and major hurdles to implement eﬃcient tax collection (i.e., a lack of a functioning
bureaucracy). In contrast, customs revenue was easy to collect.34 Moreover, from the
perspective of landowners, relying on customs revenue for ￿nancing military spending,
which accounted for ￿over 70 percent and often more than 90 percent of all revenues￿
33It is easy to extend our model to account for positive military spending together with zero schooling
investments (i.e., G =0 ) in political equilibrium of an open and oligarchic system. Note that tariﬀs
have in common with the considered lump-sum taxation that both farmers and (given that they also
consume some manufacturing products) workers bear some share of the tax burden. Now suppose that
the utility function is given by u(x,y)+Z(M),w h e r eM is military spending (and Z0 > 0, Z00 < 0).
Then a balanced budget requires that assumption A2 is replaced by TB(I)=TS(I)=TW(I)=G+M,
where T includes tariﬀ revenues. Qualitatively our results remain unchanged with this extension, and,
in addition, M>0 and thus T>0 will emerge in political equilibrium under either scenario.
34As pointed out by Centeno (1997, p. 1587): ￿Custom taxes represented an ideal solution to ￿scal
problems given the orgaizational ease with which they could be collected. A few soldiers in the main
ports could provide considerable income.￿
29(BØrtola and Williamson, 2003, p. 18), was obviously preferred by landlords to its
alternatives: a land or property tax (like in the U.S.).35
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has proposed a two-sector general equilibrium model with tax-￿nanced
public education which addresses the long-standing debate of the comparatively slow
development in many land- or resource abundant economies like in South America or
the Caribbean, relative to a prospering North of what today is the US and Canada.
Consistent with the hypotheses of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ in a series of papers, based
on overwhelming empirical evidence, we provided a politico-economic analysis which
relates the divergence in development paths between New World economies to a failure
to introduce or strengthen public education institutions in landowner-dominated, feudal
systems. As a new aspect, we brought the role of trade regimes into this debate. We
have argued that access to foreign manufacturing goods has been an important factor
for the ruling class of big landowners to oppose productivity-enhancing institutions like
public schooling. This has been an impediment for both development and structural
change.36 Our analysis suggests that negligence of public education provision and the
dismal growth performance in formerly colonized countries might have been avoided
under more restrictive trade constraints, and would not have occurred under more
democratic constitutions. Stronger trade restriction would have meant less access of
the elites to cheap manufacturing products from abroad. This raises the need to incur
the costs of public investment for forming a productive labor force at home.
Interestingly, a similar argument may be made for the cotton exporters in the South
of the U.S. in the 19th century. According to North (1961, pp. 133-134), ￿the dominant
35According to Centeno (1997, p. 1578), in Brazil, ￿taxes on wealth and production contributed
to less than 4% of ordinary revenue even during the war years￿, and in Chile, ￿[l]and rents never
accounted for more than 3% of total receipts￿. In contrast, ￿[t]ariﬀs were particularly attractive to
the rural elite. [...] The ￿scal use of trade thus contradicted any possibility of protectionists economic
policy￿ (Centeno, 1997, p. 1588).
36In contrast, structural change in the US has been fast. The agricultural employment share in the
U.S. has declined from 50 percent in 1870 to 32 percent in 1910, 20.9 percent in 1930 and 11 percent
in 1950 (Broadberry, 1998, Tab. 5).
30planter class [...] could see little return to them in investment in human capital. Ex-
penditures to educate the large percentage of white southerners who were outside the
plantation system was something they vigorously opposed￿ (see also Nicholls, 1956).
In contrast, the political preferences of workers (or people with little land) are in
favor of institutions which foster the development of the manufacturing sector. More-
over, our analysis suggests that an open and democratic economy is typically most
prone to structural change, compared to any alternative mix of the political system
and trade regime.
What are the political implications of our analysis for developing countries today?
Under the widely-accepted hypothesis that an eﬀective public schooling system is a
crucial factor for growth, ￿rst, it suggests that supporting democratization may be a
prerequisite for the development of countries with a large agricultural or natural re-
source sector. Second, opening up an economy to goods trade without democratization
may be harmful for the development process.37
However, the second policy lesson should be treated with caution. We should em-
phasize that one has to distinguish clearly between openness to goods trade and other
forms of opening up the economy, e.g., to allow for factor mobility, foreign direct invest-
ment, and media-provided information, which are issues we have not studied here. In
fact, both capital and labor mobility may have the often stressed positive growth eﬀects
due to technology transfer and knowledge spillovers (in addition to raising eﬃciency
by equalizing marginal products) also under an oligarchic political system. Moreover,
our focus was on the development process of economies through human capital in-
vestments rather than the usual static gains from trade. One should also note that,
although openness may indeed have been an obstacle to growth in the 19th century
(e.g., O￿Rourke, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2001; Vamvakidis, 2002),38 evidence
37There is no shortage of theoretical approaches which are consistent with a negative relationship
between openness and growth. These include, for instance, the infant-industry argument (e.g. Bard-
han, 1970) or explanations related to endogenous growth through technical change (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman, 1990; Young, 1991). In contrast, we have provided a politico-economic mechanism
which suggests that a systematically negative relationship between openness and growth occurs in
landowner-dominated elite societies only.
38In a sample of mostly European and New World economies, Vamvakidis (2002) ￿nds that the
31for the late 20th century suggests the contrary (e.g., Harrison, 1995; Sachs and Warner,
1995).39 In the context of our analysis this means that, contrary to a more historical
perspective, landowners are no longer the ruling class even in oligarchic systems.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that ￿ ξ
0
(G)=[ αY(G) − αX(G)]ξ/G. Applying the im-
plicit function theorem to (9), and substituting ￿ ξ
0
,w eo b t a i n∂￿ p/∂G =[ αY − αX]ξ￿ LY/[G ￿ RD0].









where ε(p)=−pD0(p)/D(p) has been used. Since ε(p) > 0, ∂￿ p(•)/∂G<0,a c c o r d i n g
to assumption A1. Noting that ￿ LY(s,b) is decreasing and ￿ R(s,b) is increasing in both
s and b,t h ee ﬀects of s and b on ￿ p(G,s,b) immediately follow from (9). ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 0 ) ,(∂ ￿ w/∂G)(G/w)=( ∂￿ p/∂G)(G/p)+αY.
After substitution of (18) the result is easily con￿rmed. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The arguments which prove Proposition 1 are outlined
in the main text. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1. According to Lemma 1, the result is obvious for cases
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 1. For cases (ii) and (iv), note that ￿ w(G, ￿ s,1) = wS and
￿ w(G,0,￿ b)=wB imply ￿ p(G,￿ s,1)￿ ξ(G)=ρS/(1 + ρS) and ￿ p(G,0,￿ b)￿ ξ(G)=ρB/(1 + ρB),
relationship between openness (as measured by various indicators) and growth is negative for the
time intervals 1870-1910 and 1920-1940, although statistically signi￿c a n tf o rt h el a t t e rp e r i o do n l y .
Focussing on a panel of ten, nowadays rich countries for the period 1875-1914, O￿Rourke provides
evidence for a rather substantial positive relationship between tariﬀs and growth. In a similar vein,
Clemens and Williamson (2001) ￿nd that tariﬀsh a v ep r o m o t e dg r o w t hf r o mt h e1 8 7 0 su n t i lW o r l d
War II.
39See, however, Yanikkaya (2003) for a modi￿cation of this result and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001)
for a critical review of the literature.
32respectively. Since ￿ ξ
0
> 0, ￿ p must decrease with G in both cases. This proves that
￿ pAUT(G) is declining in G within a given case. Now consider a switch between case
(i) and (ii). Choose ﬂ G so that ￿ w( ﬂ G,1,1) = wS, i.e., ￿ p( ﬂ G,1,1)￿ ξ(G)=ρS/(1 + ρS) and
suppose that G is increased to G0 > ﬂ G.I f￿ w(G0,1,1) <w S,t h e nw es t a yi nc a s e( i )
with ￿ p(G0,1,1) < ￿ p( ﬂ G,1,1), according to Lemma 1. If ￿ w(G0,1,1) >w S,t h e nw es w i t c h
to (ii) with ￿ w(G0, ￿ s,1) = wS and thus ￿ p(G0, ￿ s,1)￿ ξ(G0)=ρS/(1 + ρS)=￿ p( ﬂ G,1,1)￿ ξ( ﬂ G).
Since ￿ ξ(G0) > ￿ ξ( ﬂ G), ￿ p(G0,￿ s,1) < ￿ p( ﬂ G,1,1). Analogous arguments apply for switches
between other cases. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Follows immediately from comparing wSOE =ﬂ pfY(G)
and threshold wages wi = AXρi/(1 + ρi), i = B,S,u s i n g￿ ξ(G)=fY(G)/fX(G). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Part (i). Using w =ﬂ pfY(G) and p =ﬂ p in (12), we have
G
B
SOE =a r gm a x
G≥0
'£






implying the ￿rst-order condition f0
X(G)−ﬂ pf0
Y(G) ≤ 1/ρB, with strict equality if G>0.
Hence, if f0
X(G) < 1/ρB +ﬂ pf0
Y(G) for all G (assumption A3), then GB
SOE =0 .F o rt h e
autarky case, consider the Example: AX = const., u(x,y)=xχy1−χ. Then, wAUT is
independent of G in either scenario of Proposition 1. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
g(p)=Λ/p1−χ,w h e r eΛ ≡ χχ(1−χ)1−χ > 0.U s i n gt h i sa n dp = wAUT/fY(G) ≡ pAUT
in (12), we have
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33Since the left-hand side of (22) decreases from in￿nity to zero as G increases, the
level of G implicitly de￿ned by (22) is strictly positive. Moreover, (21) implies that
∂2V B
AUT/∂G2 < 0 whenever ∂V B
AUT/∂G =0 .T h u s ,GB
AUT > 0.T h i sc o n ￿rms part (i).
To prove part (ii), ￿rst, note that GW
SOE =a r gm a x
G≥0
{[ﬂ pfY(G) − G]g(ﬂ p)},a c c o r d i n g
to (13) with wSOE =ﬂ pfY(G). The expression for GW
SOE then immediately follows from
the corresponding ￿rst-order condition (also note that the second-order condition holds
since f00
Y < 0). To examine GW
AUT, we again consider the Example,f o rw h i c h
G
W



















with strict equality if G>0. Like (22), this determines a unique GW
AUT > 0.M o r e o v e r ,






Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) immediately follows from part (i) of Lemma 3.
Evaluating (24) at GW
SOE = f0
Y
−1(1/ﬂ p),w es e et h a tw ec a na l w a y s￿nd values of ﬂ p or
of the exogenous parameters determining wAUT by (11) so that GW
SOE >,=,<G W
AUT.
This con￿rms parts (ii). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Part (i) follows from Lemma 3. Regarding part (ii),
comparison of (22) and (24) reveals that GB
AUT >G W
AUT in the Example,s i n c ewAUT <
AXρB/(1 + ρB)=wB whenever big landlords are not inclined to become workers
(Proposition 1). To see that also GB
AUT ≤ GW
AUT is possible, suppose again Cobb-
Douglas utility but now assume f0
X(G) > 0. Also suppose, for instance, that G is
in a range such that (sAUT,b AUT)=( 1 ,1), and thus, wAUT = z(1,1)fX(G),w h e r e



















,i = B,W, (25)
where φ
B ≡ (1 − z(1,1))ρB and φ
W ≡ z(1,1).S u p p o s et h a tV i
AUT is strictly concave









< (=)0. Using (25), GW














. Substituting this into the expression
for ∂V B
AUT/∂G, which can be calculated from (25), and noting that mB >m W requires
φ
B > φ






< (=)0 if and only if αX(GW
AUT) >
(=)1. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Part (a). To prove part (i), recall from Proposition
2, part (i), that ﬂ p￿ ξ(GW
SOE) < ρS/(1 + ρS) implies that small landlords do not want
to become workers at G = GW
SOE under openness. If they are active as farmers, they
prefer G =0if f0
X(G)−ﬂ pf0
Y(G) < 1/ρS for all G ≥ 0, according to (12). Since ρB > ρS,
this always holds under A3. Also note that ￿ ξ
0
(G) > 0 under A1, i.e., ￿ ξ(0) < ￿ ξ(GW
SOE).
Thus, ﬂ p￿ ξ(0) < ρS/(1 + ρS); that is, small landlords are indeed farmers at G =0 .T h i s
con￿rms part (i).
If ﬂ p￿ ξ(0) > ρS/(1 + ρS), then, according to Proposition 2, part (ii), small landlords
want to become workers at both G =0and G = GW
SOE,w h i c hc o n ￿rms part (ii).
Under the presumption of part (iii), small landlords are farmers if G =0and
become workers if G = GW
SOE, according to Proposition 2. Thus, they prefer G =0iﬀ






g(ﬂ p), and prefer G = GW
SOE otherwise,
where the left-hand side of the preceding inequality equals the maximum utility which
can be obtained as farmer (recall that assumption A3 implies (f0
X(G) − ﬂ pf0
Y(G))ρS <
1 for all G ≥ 0), and the right-hand side the one which can be obtained as worker.
40As u ﬃcient condition is ￿ ξ
00
≤ 0. Using de￿nition ξ = fY /fX,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t￿ ξ
00
≤ 0
is equivalent to 2αX(αY − αX)+ηY αY − ηXαX ≥ 0,w h e r eηj ≡− Gf00
j /f0
j, j = X,Y. Observing
αY > αX (assumption A1), this holds, for instance, if ηX ≤ ηY .
35Rearranging terms con￿rms part (iii).
Part (b). First, note that under autarky the interests of workers and small landlords
coincide if s<1. Thus, small landlords can never lose in this case when the political
system is switching from an oligarchy (with GB
AUT) to a democracy (with GW
AUT)a s
long as s<1.F o rs =1 , however, as GB
AUT >,=,<G W
AUT is possible (Proposition 4),
it is unclear whether small landlords gain or lose from a switch of the political system.
¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose ﬂ p￿ ξ(0) ≤ ρS/(1 + ρS) < ﬂ p￿ ξ(GW




−1(1/ﬂ p). According to Proposition 2, sSOE =1if G =0 ,w h e r e a ssSOE =0
if G = GW
SOE. This implies that the economy switches to sSOE =0in democracy,
if starting from G =0before voting takes place. In contrast, since GB
SOE =0 ,t h e
economy always gets stuck in sSOE =1in a feudal society. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. First, recall that GB
SOE =0 . Thus, according to (12),













where pAUT =￿ pAUT(GB
AUT). First, suppose GB
AUT > 0. According to assumption A3,
f0
X(G)− ﬂ pf0
Y(G) < 1/ρB for all G ≥ 0. Taking integrals of both sides of this inequality




AUT) − ﬂ pfY(G
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Inequality (27) together with pAUT > ﬂ p and thus g(pAUT) <g (ﬂ p) (since g0(•) < 0) imply
that the left-hand side of (26) is strictly smaller than the right-hand side of (26). For
GB
AUT =0 , the result immediately follows from (26). This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .Using (13), workers are worse oﬀ (better oﬀ)i na u t a r k y
















where pAUT =￿ pAUT(GW
AUT) and wAUT =￿ wAUT(GW
AUT).( A l s or e c a l lGW
SOE =( f0
Y)−1(1/ﬂ p).)
It suﬃces to look at our Example,i nw h i c hg(p)=Λ/p1−χ. Using this, we next show
that there always exists a ﬂ p ∈ R++ such that both sides of (28) are equal. To see this,
￿rst, note that the right-hand side of (28) is strictly positive, according to (24) and
GW
AUT > 0. Second, using the facts that ﬂ pf0
Y(GW
SOE)=1and g(p)=Λ/p1−χ,w eo b t a i n
that Q0(ﬂ p)=Λ[χﬂ pfY(•)+( 1− χ)GW
SOE]/ﬂ p2−χ > 0. Third, by employing L￿H￿pital￿s



















(1 − χ) lim
ﬂ p→∞ p−χ →∞ . (30)
This con￿rms that there exists a ﬂ p ∈ R++ such that (28) holds with equality. Denote
this level by ﬂ pAUT.S i n c e Q0(ﬂ p) > 0,w e￿nd that openness (autarky) is preferred if
ﬂ p>(<)ﬂ pAUT.M o r e o v e r , s i n c elim
ﬂ p→0 Q(ﬂ p)=0 , it is obvious that there exists a ﬂ p such
that ﬂ p<ﬂ pAUT and ﬂ p<p AUT[= ￿ pAUT(GW
AUT)], which proves that workers may prefer
autarky if ﬂ p<p AUT.
Finally, we need to show that also openness is possibly preferred if ﬂ p<p AUT.
The following speci￿cations in our Example suﬃce. Let fY(G)=1+G1/2, χ =0 .5
(i.e., g(p)=0 .5/
√




SOE =0 .25,a n dQ(1) = 0.625. Moreover, using that GW
AUT is given by (24),
holding with equality, and denoting c =
p
GW
AUT, we obtain after rearranging terms
that c is given by c2 +0 .8c − 0.25 = 0, i.e., c =(
√
41 − 4)/10 ≈ 0.24.T h u s ,pAUT =
wAUT/fY(GW
AUT)=1 .25/(1 + c) > 1[= ﬂ p]. Moreover, since the utility level of workers
37under autarky is given by [wAUT − GW
AUT]g(pAUT)=[ 1 .25 − c2]0.5(pAUT)−1/2,w e￿nd




5 ≈ 0.59, which is below the
utility level of workers under openness, 0.625[= Q(1)]. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows from Proposition 2, by replacing ￿ ξ(G) by AY(t)/AX
and observing LY = ￿ LY(sSOE,b SOE). ¥








−βtdt s.t. (14), (15) and lim
T→∞
AY(T) ≥ 0, (31)
given AY(0) = ΨI
0 and LY(0) = LI
Y. I ti st h u so b v i o u st h a tt h e yl o s ef r o ma n y
increase of productivity AY, be it directly from public investment or indirectly through
structural change. ¥
Proof of Proposition 10. To prove the result, we ￿rst derive the dynamical
system arising under openness in democracy. We ￿rst neglect the evolution of LY con-
ditional on AY, indicated by (15). Note that with our focus on b =1 , LY ∈ {LI
Y,L II
Y }.
The current-value Hamiltonian function for the utility maximization problem (17),
HW
SOE,r e a d s
H
W







where λ is the current-value co-state variable associated with (14). The ￿rst-order
conditions with respect to control variable G and state variable AY are given by
∂HW
SOE/∂G =0and −∂HW















41The transversality condition associated with constraint lim
T→∞
AY (T) ≥ 0 reads
lim
T→∞
e−βTλ(T)AY (T)=0 , which can be rewritten as lim
T→∞
e−βTAY (T)1−γ/f0
Y (G(T)) = 0,a c -
c o r d i n gt o( 3 3 ) . T h u s ,i f lim
T→∞
AY (T)=const. and lim
T→∞
G(T)=const., it becomes lim
T→∞
e−βT =0 ,
i.e., for any steady state the transversality condition holds.
38where ηY(G) ≡− f00
Y(G)G/f0
Y(G) > 0,a n d
œ λ
λ






Substituting the expressions for λ and œ λ/λ from (33) into (34), using œ AY/AY =
fY(G)(AY)









We are now ready to prove part (a). Substituting (16) into (35), setting œ G =0and




















Y(G)=0 ,g i v e nLY ∈ {LI
Y,L II
Y },w eh a v e
0 <G ∗ < ∞ for any G∗ satisfying (36).42 In turn, since LI
Y <L II















0.T h i sc o n ￿rms part (i).43
For part (b), note that ∂ œ AY/∂G>0, according to (14). Also note that, for given
LY, ∂ œ G/∂AY < 0, according to (35). We now turn to the œ AY =0and œ G =0loci in
AY − G−space. From (14), it is easy to check that the œ AY =0locus has a ￿nite and




β + δ(1 − γ)
(AY)
γ (LY)θ . (37)
Thus, observing the boundary conditions of f0
Y and LY = Φ(AY) ∈ {LI
Y,L II
Y },w eh a v e
42Due to the boundary conditions of f0
Y , existence of a steady state equilibrium is ensured for θ =0 .
43The steady state equilibrium can be de￿ned as a pair (A∗














according to (15), (16) and (36).









γ [β + δ(1 − γ)]
ﬂ pf00
Y(G)(LY)θ (AY)
γ+1 > 0. (38)
Together with ∂ œ AY/∂G>0, ∂ œ G/∂AY < 0 and the fact that G>0 for any AY > 0 at
the œ G =0locus, public investment initially jumps to G(0) > 0,a n dt h ed e v e l o p m e n t
path conditional on the employment regime (i.e., given LY) is a saddle path, as shown in
Fig. 2. Now recall that AY(0) = ΨI
0.T h u s ,i fθ =0 , A∗
Y and G∗ are independent of LY,
and the steady state of the political equilibrium is characterized by the minimum levels
of (A∗
Y,G ∗) which solve (16) and (36), i.e., the dynamical system converges to a unique
steady state equilibrium. If θ > 0, gradual productivity increases may ultimately imply
a switch from Regime I to II, according to Corollary 2, and thus may lead to a jump
in G. It remains to be shown that structural change boosts both A∗
Y and G∗.T os e e
this, note that an increase in LY, associated with structural change from Regime I to
II, shifts the œ AY =0locus (which is given by fY(G)(LY)
θ = δ (AY)
1−γ, according to
(14)) downward and, according to (37), the œ G =0locus upward (see Fig. 3). This
concludes the proof of part (b). ¥
Proof of Proposition 11. Recall that initially the economy is in Regime I.
Moreover, with Cobb-Douglas utility, w(t)=( 1− χ) ﬂ RAX/[χLI
Y] ≡ wI is independent
of AY under autarky, according to (11), and thus, time-independent. Thus, irrespective
of the decisions of the pivotal class (of big landowners or workers, respectively), the











−βtdt s.t. (14), (15), lim
T→∞
AY(T) ≥ 0, (39)
given AY(0) = ΨI
0 and, for all t, LY(t)=LI
Y.R e c a l l t h a t g(p)=Λ/p1−χ in the
Cobb-Douglas case. Moreover, p(t)=wI/AY(t). Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian
40function for the utility maximization problem (39), HB


















where Θ ≡ Λ
£
(1 − χ) ﬂ RAX/(χLI
Y)
⁄χ−1 > 0.T h e￿rst-order conditions ∂HB
AUT/∂G =0
and −∂HB

























































β + δ(2 − χ − γ)


































[β + δ(2 − χ − γ)]. (46)
Since the left hand side of (46) is strictly decreasing from in￿nity to approaching zero,
we have G∗ > 0. In sum, the preceding results give rise to the phase diagram in Fig.
44Again, λ is the current-value co-state variable associated with (14). Moreover, it can again be
shown that the transversality condition holds.
414.
For the political equilibrium in a closed democracy, just replace the gross income
of big landowners in Regime I,
¡
AX − wI¢
ρB,w i t ht h ew a g er a t ewI (i.e., the income
of workers in Regime I) everywhere (compare (12) and (13)), which reveals that the
dynamical system under autarky is qualitatively similar in either political system. This
concludes the proof. ¥
B. Introducing a Land Market
In the main text, our assumptions endogenously removed transactions of land from
the model when structural change occurred. Small landlords left their land idle when
becoming a worker. In this appendix, we extend our framework by introducing a land
market in the analysis.
The key modi￿cation is to relax the following two assumptions: ￿rst, that small
landlords have to devote their entire unit time endowment to supervise production,
and second, that the supervising capacity of big landowners is limited to the initially








where the term a>0 (which may be a function of ρS) indicates that a small landlord
is productive on his land apart from supervising, AS
X ≥ 0. AS
X =0implies that he
does not employ dependent workers. The technology of big landlords still has the
form xB = AB
X min(ρB,l B), where, possibly, AB
X 6= AS
X.45 However, in contrast to
the assumption in the main text, they can supervise work at additional land without
hiring a supervising agent. Let π denote the price per unit of land and suppose AS
X > 0
￿rst. Then a small landlord is willing to sell his land and become worker if w +πρS ≥
(AS
X − w)ρS + a, which is equivalent to π ≥ AS
X +
£
a − w(1 + ρS)
⁄
/ρS ≡ πS. πS is
a small landlord￿s ￿willingness to accept￿ a buy oﬀer. The ￿willingness to pay￿ of
45Allowing for AB
X >A S
X captures, for instance, that big landlords, which may be thought of early
settlers in the New World economies, had access to more fertile land or, due to size advantages, were
able to exploit scale economies (Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002).





landowners are both willing and able to sell their land to big landowners whenever
πS ≤ π ≤ πB.N o t e t h a t πS ≤ πB is equivalent to w ≥ a − ρS(AB
X − AS
X) ≡ ﬂ w.
If ﬂ w ≤ 0, then land is sold immediately at some price between πS and πB,s os m a l l
landlords would disappear from the model. Suppose ﬂ w>0, i.e., the average land
productivity in small farms must exceed that of big farmers for this land, e.g., because
of particular eﬀort a small landowner exerts. Moreover, we have to ensure that the
resulting equilibrium land price, AB
X − ﬂ w, is positive. In sum, 0 < ﬂ w<A B
X,w h i c h
requires AB
X <A S
X + a/ρS <A B
X(1 + 1/ρS).I f AS
X =0 , a similar logic applies. It
is easy to show that, in this case, the willingness to accept for a small landowner is
πS =( a − w)/ρS.I f AB
X ≥ a/ρS,t h e nπS ≤ πB for any w and small landowners
disappear from the model. Supoose AB
X <a / ρS.T h e n ,f o ra n yw, πS > πB if ρS ≥ 1.
No land market can arise in this case. For ρS < 1, ﬂ w =( a − ρSAB
X)/(1 − ρS),a n d
0 < ﬂ w<A B
X if a<A B
X <a / ρS.
We focus on the speci￿cations of the dynamic model, i.e., productivity parameters
AB
X and AS
X are constants and utility is Cobb-Douglas. Thus, under autarky, w is
independent of the stage of development, so either land is sold in the initial period at
price AB
X − ﬂ w or structural change never occurs. In contrast, under openness, no land
is sold (sSOE =1 )a sl o n ga sw<ﬂ w,w h e r e a ssSOE =0when w ≥ ﬂ w. Thus, (15)
has to be modi￿ed to LY(t)=LI
Y if AY(t) < ﬂ w/ﬂ p (early stage of development) and
LY(t)=LII
Y in a later stage of development, i.e., structural change eventually occurs
in the process of development if initial productivity ΨI
0 < ﬂ w/ﬂ p. Most importantly,
Propositions 9-11 hold under the modi￿cations of this appendix. As the equilibrium
land price, π = AB
X − ﬂ w, is equal to the willingness to pay of big landowners, they
don￿t get any rent from acquiring land in economic equilibrium. This implies that
their policy preferences towards public investment G remain unaﬀected under either
trade regime.
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